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I.

INTRODUCTION
Following the September 11, 2001 attacks, America’s signals
intelligence community began growing exponentially in scope and
power. In the forefront of this community was the National Security
Agency (“NSA”), acting with the aid of the USA PATRIOT Act.1
Between 2001 and 2013, the scope of the NSA’s surveillance programs
grew to include not only foreign communications, but also the mass
collection of domestic metadata, including information on routing,
senders, and recipients of phone calls, texts, and emails.2
The extent of domestic surveillance has come to light primarily
through leaks of classified documents and specifically, those occurring in
May 2013, by former NSA contractor, Edward Snowden.3 The NSA is
now facing unprecedented challenges to the legality of these programs
from private citizens bringing Fourth Amendment actions, technology
companies demanding more transparency about the demands being
placed on them by Foreign Intelligence Service Court (“FISC”) orders,
and now Congress introducing bipartisan legislation to counteract the
PATRIOT Act’s provisions and the domestic surveillance that the NSA
conducts.4
This Article will discuss the historical post-9/11 timeline relative to
the domestic surveillance program. It addresses the underlying historical
and constitutional concept of the Fourth Amendment, Third Party
Doctrine, which the federal government is relying upon to justify the
legality of mass domestic surveillance, as well as to defend legal
challenges to the programs. This Article will provide an analysis of
legislative proposals addressing NSA surveillance overreach, including
the USA FREEDOM Act and its subsequent manager’s amendment,
1 United and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107–56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 5, 8, 10, 12, 15, 18, 20–22, 28, 31, 42, 47, 49–50 U.S.C.).
2 The NSA utilized contact chaining as a process of “building a network graph that
models the communication . . . patte[rn]s of targeted entities . . . and their associates from
the communication sent or received by the targets.” OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, ST09-0002, 13 (Mar. 24, 2009), available at
http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/jun/27/nsa-inspector-general-reportdocument-data-collection [hereinafter OIG Report].
3 Mirren Gidda, Edward Snowden and the NSA Files—Timeline, THE GUARDIAN (Aug.
21, 2013, 5:54PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/23/edward-snowden-nsafiles-timeline.
4 Uniting and Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and Ending Eavesdropping,
Dragnet-collection, and Online Monitoring Act, H.R. 3361, S. 1599, 113th Cong. § 1 (2013)
[hereinafter FREEDOM Act].
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address their strengths and weaknesses, and discuss potential courses of
legislative and judicial action to address these issues.5 Part II of this
Article addresses the timeline by which the NSA’s surveillance programs
were developed; Part III addresses the Third Party Doctrine under the
Fourth Amendment; Part IV discusses legal challenges to the NSA
surveillance programs before and after the Snowden leaks; Part V
analyzes legislation proposed during the 113th Congress that addresses
domestic NSA surveillance; Part VI looks at the strengths and weakness
of the proposed legislation; Part VII reviews presidential action on the
surveillance reforms; and Part VIII concludes this Article by discussing
further judicial and legislative actions to address domestic surveillance
concerns and the need to maintain a balance between privacy and security
as technology advances.
II. 9/11 TO TODAY—THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NSA’S
SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS
Immediately after the 9/11 attacks, the NSA took the first steps
toward developing mass surveillance infrastructure as we know it today.
First, on September 14, 2001, NSA Director General Michael Hayden
approved targeted surveillance of specific, preapproved telephone
numbers generating communications between the United States and
foreign countries with known terrorist activities.6 The congressional
intelligence committees were made aware of these targeted collections
shortly thereafter, and by October 4, 2001, authority had been granted to
collect content data for such calls and emails.7
The NSA initially pushed back at Vice President Dick Cheney’s
Office’s suggestion that Executive Order (“EO”) 12333 permitted the
data collection program to apply toward intercepting domestic
communications.8 Regardless, the program began expanding when
5

Id.
See OIG Report, supra note 2, at 3 (asserting that by September 26, 2001, the NSA
anticipated collecting all telephonic metadata between the U.S. and Afghanistan).
7 OIG Report, supra note 2, at 7.
8 Exec. Order No. 12,333, Part 2.3, 3 C.F.R. 1981 (1981) (stating “Collection of
Information. Agencies within the Intelligence Community are authorized to collect, retain or
disseminate information concerning United States persons only in accordance with
procedures established by the head of the agency concerned and approved by the Attorney
General, consistent with the authorities provided by Part 1 of this Order . . . of the following
types of information; (c) Information obtained in the course of a lawful foreign intelligence,
counterintelligence, international narcotics or international terrorism investigation; (d)
Information needed to protect the safety of any persons or organizations, including those who
6

OMBRES.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

30

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

1/22/2015 10:30 AM

[Vol. 39:1

Attorney General John Ashcroft signed off on its implementation per EO
12333 and the NSA General Counsel declared the program legal on
October 5, 2001.9
By late 2002, the NSA was reaching out to telecommunication
companies (“telecoms”) to gain assistance with the surveillance program
and in early 2003, installed a system at one of AT&T’s San Francisco
locations to collect and analyze communications data.10 The NSA also
reached voluntary agreements with three unidentified companies to share
information under the program’s authority, allowing it to gain access to
eighty-one percent of all international telephone calls.11 Formal letters
requested information regarding communications traffic that may
terminate in the United States, aggregated call record information, and
computer-to-computer data.12
By 2004, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) and Central
Intelligence Agency (“CIA”) became involved to improve collaborative
analytics.13 Despite some pushback from the telecoms, the data collection
continued.14 In 2004, Attorney General Ashcroft forwarded letters
necessitating continued cooperation, stating that the law for data
collection required no warrant or court order.15 In July 2004, the FISC
began issuing orders permitting the collection of metadata under the
program pursuant to pen register (“PR”) and trap and trace (“TT”)
are targets, victims or hostages of international terrorist organizations; . . . (i) Incidentally
obtained information that may indicate involvement in activities that may violate federal,
state, local or foreign laws . . . .”).
9 Electronic
Frontier Foundation, Timeline of NSA Domestic Spying,
https://www.eff.org/nsa-spying/timeline (last visited Nov. 21, 2014) (citing ERIC LICHTBLAU,
BUSH’S LAW: THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN JUSTICE (First Anchor Books 2009) (stating White
House associates “shoved” the order in front of Ashcroft and “told him to sign it.”)); see OIG
Report, supra note 2, at 9, 11 (conveying that on October 11, 2001, the NSA GC for
Operations and Deputy GC were read in and agreed to the program’s legality).
10 Decl. of Mark Klein, 3:5-26, Mar. 28, 2006, Jewel v. NSA, 965 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (N.D.
Cal. 2013), available at https://www.eff.org/document/unredacted-klein-declaration.
11 See OIG Report, supra note 2, at 27, 29–30.
12 OIG Report, supra note 2, at 31.
13 OIG Report, supra note 2, at 12–13.
14 OIG Report, supra note 2, at 30 (showing that three companies declined to support the
NSA’s surveillance efforts for various reasons, including corporate liability concerns and a
request to obtain an opinion from outside counsel).
15 OIG Report, supra note 2, at 32. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(ii)(B) (2012),
providing that no warrant or court order is required if authorization is provided by the AG,
Deputy AG, Associate AG or other principal prosecuting attorney who reasonably believes
that an emergency situation exists that involves conspiratorial activities threatening the
national security interest. See also 18 U.S.C. § 2518(7)(a)(ii) (2012).
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authority, and now renews the orders quarterly.16 The domestic
surveillance program’s capture of purely domestic communications and
the NSA’s backdoor access to telecoms was revealed in 2005.17
On May 24, 2006, the FISC first executed an order utilizing business
records as a basis for continued dragnet collection of telephone metadata
as it had under prior executive authority, and continues to renew the order
every ninety days.18 Additionally, the order expanded the definition of
“facility” to include gateways or cable heads through which mass
communications are directed.19 In August 2007, President Bush signed
into law the Protect America Act, which gave the NSA the power to
collect information if it “reasonably believed” that the surveillance target
is overseas.20 In 2008, President Bush also signed into law the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”) Amendments Act, which gave
retroactive immunity to telecoms that cooperated with NSA surveillance
programs and provided greater authority to Attorney General Ashcroft
and the Director of National Intelligence (“DNI”) to conduct surveillance
on citizens.21 The collection of Internet metadata continues as domestic
communications are collected “in the course of monitoring foreign
16 Before 2006, only the presiding Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISC”)
judge, Royce Lamberth and his successor, Colleen Kollar-Kotelly, were briefed on the
program. OIG Report, supra note 2, at 25, 41. A pen register is a mechanical device that
records the numbers dialed on a telephone by monitoring the electrical impulses caused when
the dial on the telephone is released. It does not overhear oral communications and does not
indicate whether calls are actually completed." Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 736, n. 1
(1979) (citing United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 169, 169 (1977)). A “trap and trace”
device is a “device or process that records the sources of incoming signals to a specific phone
or computer. Often used by law enforcement as the advanced counterpart of Caller ID. A
trap and trace device identifies the phone numbers or Internet addresses of incoming signals,
but does not include substantive information transmitted by those signals.” See Legal
Information Institute, Trap and Trace Device, CORNELL UNIV. L. SCH.,
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/trap_and_trace_device (last visited Nov. 21, 2014).
17 Eric Lichtblau & James Risen, Spy Agency Mined Vast Data Trove, Officials Report,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 24, 2005),
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/24/politics/24spy.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; James
Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Spying Program Snared U.S. Calls, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2005),
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/21/politics/21nsa.html.
18 OIG Report, supra note 2, at 40.
19 OIG Report, supra note 2, at 41.
20 Protect America Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110–55, 121 Stat. 552 (codified as amended
at 5 U.S.C. §§ 1801, 1803, 1805, 1885 (2012)); see James Risen, Bush Signs Law to Widen
Reach for Wiretapping, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2007, at A1.
21 See FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–261, §§ 702–703, 122 Stat. 2436,
2437–38 (2008) (codified as 50 U.S.C. § 1881 (2012)); see also Eric Lichtblau, Senate
Approves Bill to Broaden Wiretap Powers, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2008, at A1.
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targets,” with approximately 500 billion communication records
intercepted and analyzed in 2012, via a program called “One-End
Foreign,” which relies on the FISA Amendments Act for its legality; this
is the same year that President Obama reauthorized the FISA
Amendments Act.22
Likewise, it was revealed that the NSA’s surveillance programs
expanded to include the collection of all domestic telephone calls as
reflected in a July 13, 2013 FISC order requiring that Verizon disclose all
“telephony metadata” transiting through its network on a daily basis,
pursuant to 50 U.S. § 1861.23 Similarly, a report shows that the
government used the PRISM program to collect Internet data from United
States service providers Microsoft, Yahoo, Google, Facebook, AOL,
Skype, YouTube, and Apple and used corporate partnerships to overcome
barriers to such collection.24 Also, the MUSCULAR program tapped
Yahoo and Google’s cloud computing network, based overseas, to
intercept entire email archives and years worth of messages and to “take
a retrospective look at target activity,” which can include wholly
domestic communications that are simply stored out of the country.25
Finally, recently raised concerns include the NSA working with the
National Institute of Standards and Technology (“NIST”) in placing
invidious backdoors into commercial Internet encryption algorithms to
allow unfettered governmental access to virtually all information moving
through cyberspace.26 A top secret budget document referring to the
22 Pub. L. No. 112–238, 126 Stat. 1631 (2012) (codified as 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1885
(2012)); Glenn Greenwald & Spencer Ackerman, How the NSA is Still Harvesting Your
Online Data, THE GUARDIAN (June 27, 2013),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/27/nsa-online-metadata-collection.
23 In re the Fed. Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible
Things from Verizon Bus. Network Servs. ex rel MCI Commc’n Servs., Inc., No. BR 13-80
(FISA Ct. 2013) (requiring Verizon to disclose “telephony metadata” pursuant to 50 U.S.C. §
1861), available at https://epic.org/privacy/nsa/Section-215-Order-to-Verizon.pdf.
24 Barton Gellman & Laura Poitras, U.S., British Intelligence Mining Data from Nine U.S.
Internet Companies in Broad Secret Program, WASH. POST (June 7, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-intelligence-mining-data-from-nine-usinternet-companies-in-broad-secret-program/2013/06/06/3a0c0da8-cebf-11e2-8845d970ccb04497_story.html.
25 Barton Gellman & Ashkan Soltani, NSA Infiltrates Links to Yahoo, Google Data
Centers Worldwide, Snowden Documents Say, WASH. POST (Oct. 30, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-infiltrates-links-to-yahoogoogle-data-centers-worldwide-snowden-documents-say/2013/10/30/e51d661e-4166-11e38b74-d89d714ca4dd_story.html.
26 Jeff Larson, Nicole Perlroth, & Scott Shane, Revealed: The NSA’s Secret Campaign to
Crack, Undermine Internet Security, PROPUBLICA (Sept. 5, 2013, 2:08 PM),
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SIGINT (signals intelligence) Enabling Project gives this credence, as it
reflects a $250 million annual layout toward goals of inserting
vulnerabilities in commercial encryption systems, influencing policies,
standards and specifications for commercial public key technologies, and
collecting data or metadata from cooperative networks or increased
control over networks.27
III. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT THIRD PARTY DOCTRINE AND MASS
DATA COLLECTION
There is little doubt that the collection of content data, absent
probable cause, violates the Fourth Amendment as an unreasonable
search.28 However, whether the mass collection of domestic metadata
violates the Fourth Amendment is a question that is still being wrestled
with due to the historical approval of the Third Party Doctrine (“TPD”)
arising from the seminal opinion of Smith v. Maryland.29
In Smith, a PR was used to assist in a conviction of a burglary.30 The
Supreme Court held that using a PR did not constitute an unreasonable
search because individuals are aware that phone companies maintain
permanent records of dialed phone numbers, thereby abrogating any
expectation of privacy.31 As Smith has not been overruled, it maintains
its standing as a guiding principle under stare decisis and is being
utilized, at least in part, as a basis for conducting domestic surveillance
as discussed below.
The FISC cites directly to the Smith reasoning, in a heavily redacted
http://www.propublica.org/article/the-nsas-secret-campaign-to-crack-undermine-internetencryption (explaining that the NIST creates and standardizes Internet encryption algorithms
and codes for widespread use in commercial telecommunication and e-communication
products).
27 SIGINT Enabling Project, Top Secret//SI/TK//NOFORN, 115–17, PROPUBLICA,
available at http://www.propublica.org/documents/item/784285-sigint-enablingproject.html.
28 See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 286 (6th Cir. 2010) (“Over the last decade,
email has become ‘so pervasive that some persons may consider [it] to be [an] essential means
or necessary instrument[ ] for self-expression, even self-identification.’ It follows that email
requires strong protection under the Fourth Amendment; otherwise, the Fourth Amendment
would prove an ineffective guardian of private communication, an essential purpose it has
long been recognized to serve.”) (citations omitted).
29 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
30 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (2012) (defining pen register as a device that records dialing,
routing, addressing, or signaling information by an instrument or facility from which a wire
or electronic communication is transmitted); Smith, 442 U.S. at 737.
31 Smith, 442 U.S. at 743–45 (citing United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976)).
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opinion/order, in noting that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy
in the collection of metadata.32 The FISC notes that Congress relaxed
requirements to collect “non-content addressing information through
[PR] and [TT] devices” through the PATRIOT Act and FISA
Amendments and that “such information is not protected by the Fourth
Amendment.”33 Like phone calls under Smith, the FISC held that email
users, due to the same reasoning, also do not have an expectation of
privacy.34 The FISC recognized the need for only a relevance standard,
rather than reasonable suspicion, in approving the government’s requests
for widespread surveillance.35
The FISC analogizes the low hit rate in obtaining actionable
information through dragnet metadata collection to DUI checkpoints and
drug testing students in justifying suspicionless searches.36 Further, great
deference must be given to the government officials who have a unique
understanding of these situations, and they do not need to act in the least
intrusive means available.37 In so approving of the bulk collection of
metadata, the court provided:
analogous to suspicionless searches and seizures that have upheld
under the Fourth Amendment in that the Government’s need is
compelling and immediate, the intrusion on individual privacy
interests is limited, and bulk collection appears to be a reasonably
effective means of monitoring (redacted) related operatives . . . . In
these circumstances, the certification of relevance is consistent with
the fact that only a very small proportion of the huge volume of
information collected will be directly relevant to the FBI’s (redacted)

32 Case Name and Number Redacted, at 58–59 (FISA Ct. Date Redacted) (executed by
FISC Presiding Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly), available at
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/1118/CLEANEDPRTT%201.pdf [hereinafter FISC
Opinion].
33 18 U.S.C. § 3127(4) (2012) (defining a “trap and trace device” as a device that captures
incoming electronic or other impulses that identify the originating number or other
information that identifies the source of a wire or electronic communication); FISC Opinion,
supra note 32, at 19.
34 FISC Opinion, supra note 32, at 19.
35 FISC Opinion, supra note 32, at 29 (citing 147 CONG. REC. S10990,11003 (daily ed.
Oct. 25, 2001) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (“[T]he FBI ‘made a clear case that a relevance
standard is appropriate for counterintelligence and counterterrorism investigations.’”)).
36 FISC Opinion, supra note 32, at 50–52 (citing Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92
v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2008) (discussing drug testing students)); Mich. Dep’t. of State Police
v. Sitz. 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (discussing DUI checkpoints).
37 FISC Opinion, supra note 32, at 53.
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investigations.38

IV. LEGAL CHALLENGES TO DOMESTIC SURVEILLANCE AND
JUDICIAL PUSHBACK ON THE THIRD PARTY DOCTRINE
A. Pre-Snowden Leak Cases
Several challenges to the NSA’s domestic surveillance programs
have been made against both the government and private entities working
with the government. These include Hepting v. AT&T,39 Jewel v. NSA,40
and Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation v. Bush,41 all of which sought
redress for Fourth Amendment violations under the NSA’s surveillance
programs. In Hepting, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (“EFF”)
sought to preclude AT&T from routing copies of Internet traffic directly
to the NSA.42 In Jewel, numerous individuals brought actions against the
NSA to cease the ongoing dragnet collection of metadata.43 In AlHaramain, plaintiffs, a now defunct Islamic organization, sued the Bush
administration for alleged warrantless wiretapping of the Foundation,
which they asserted violated FISA.44
In all three cases, the government moved to dismiss the actions by
asserting that the State Secrets Privilege preempted litigation.45 In what
38

FISC Opinion, supra note 32, at 54.
Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. Cal. 2006), cert. denied, Ctr. for
Constitutional Rights v. Obama, 13 S. Ct. 1497 (2014).
40 Jewel v. NSA, No. C 08-cv-4373 VRW, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5110 (N.D. Cal. Jan.
10, 2010), cert. denied, Ctr. for Constitutional Rights v. Obama, 13 S. Ct. 1497 (2014).
41 Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush (In re NSA Telecomms. Records Litig.),
633 F. Supp. 2d 949 (N.D. Cal. 2009), cert. denied, Ctr. for Constitutional Rights v. Obama,
13 S. Ct. 1497 (2014); Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 451 F. Supp. 2d 1215 (D.
Or. 2006), cert. denied, Ctr. for Constitutional Rights v. Obama, 13 S. Ct. 1497 (2014).
42 Hepting, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 974; see also In re NSA Telecomms. Records Litig., 633
F. Supp. 2d 892 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (discussing the efforts of state officials to compel
telecommunication carriers to release information regarding the disclosure of
telecommunication records to the NSA).
43 See Hepting, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 974; see also In re NSA Telecomms. Records Litig.,
633 F. Supp. 2d 892 (discussing the efforts of state officials to compel telecommunication
carriers to release information regarding the disclosure of telecommunication records to the
NSA); Complaint for Jewel, Jewel v. NSA, No. C 08-cv-4373 VRW, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
5110 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2010); see also, Electronic Frontier Found., Jewel v. NSA,
https://www.eff.org/cases/jewel (last visited Nov. 21, 2014).
44 Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc., 633 F. Supp. 2d 949; Al-Haramain Islamic Found.,
Inc., 451 F. Supp. 2d 1215.
45 Doc. No. 308 at 3, Hepting v. AT&T Corp., No. C-06-672-VRW, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 41160 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (explaining that the United States Government sought
dismissal or summary judgment based on the state secrets privilege in May 2006); see
39

OMBRES.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

36

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

1/22/2015 10:30 AM

[Vol. 39:1

turned out to be a pyrrhic victory, the courts rejected the State Secrets
Privilege argument as abrogated by 50 U.S.C. § 1806.46 However, none
of the plaintiffs have yet been successful in having their cases decided on
the merits.47 The district court dismissed Hepting because of the FISA
Amendments of 2008 that granted retroactive immunity to telecoms, and
the Ninth Circuit upheld the dismissal.48 The district court dismissed
Jewel on the statutory claims for damages under FISA and for injunctive
relief on sovereign immunity grounds, although the Fourth Amendment
question may yet survive.49 In Al-Haramain, the district court granted a
summary judgment award of $2.5 million in damages. The Ninth Circuit
reversed and dismissed that judgment, holding that the government did
not waive sovereign immunity and that to be individually liable under 50
U.S.C. § 1810, the governmental official subject to the claim must also
be subject to criminal prosecution.50
In the most high profile case, Clapper v. Amnesty International

Government Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment, Doc. No. 18, Jewel
v. NSA, No. C:08-cv-4373-VRW, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5110 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2010);
see also Kurt Opshal, Breaking News: Court Holds That FISA Preempts State Secret
Privilege,
ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER
FOUND.
(July
2,
2008),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2008/07/court-rules-fisa-preempts-state-secret-privilege
(explaining the Northern District of California held that the FISA Act preempted the State
Secrets Privilege in Al Haramain v. Bush). The State Secrets Privilege is one that must be
formally asserted by the head of the department with control over the matter, and the Court
must do without forcing the disclosure of the privileged information. The government may
not be required to divulge the information for an in camera inspection by the court if the judge
finds, based on “all the evidence and circumstances” that there is a reasonable danger that
such disclosure would “expose military matters, which in the interest of national security,
should not be divulged.” United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1953).
46 50 U.S.C. § 1806(f) (2012) provides that if the disclosure of documents subject to a
legal challenge would harm national security, same may be reviewed ex parte and in camera
by the court; see also, Jewel v. NSA, 965 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1105 (N.D. Cal. 2013); Hepting,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41160, at *10; Opshal, supra note 45 (referencing the Northern
District of California’s ruling that the FISA Act preempted the State Secrets Privilege in AlHaramain v. Bush).
47 Jewel, 965 F. Supp. 2d at 1097; Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Obama, 705 F.3d
845, 855 (9th Cir. 2012); NSA Telecomms. Records Litig. v. AT&T Corp., 671 F.3d 881 (9th
Cir. 2011).
48 NSA Telecomms. Records Litig., 671 F.3d 881, cert denied, Hepting v. AT&T Corp.,
133 S. Ct. 421 (2012).
49 Jewel, 965 F. Supp. 2d at 1097.
50 “An aggrieved person . . . who has been subjected to an electronic surveillance . . . in
violation of [50 U.S.C. § 1809] shall have a cause of action against any person who committed
such violation . . . .” 50 U.S.C. § 1810 (2012); Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc., 705 F.3d
at 855.
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USA,51 a number of international groups sought to have Section 702 of the
FISA Amendments Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1881(a), declared facially
unconstitutional as violating the Fourth Amendment by asserting that
surveillance on their international activities compromised their ability to
“locate witnesses, cultivate sources, obtain information, and
communicate confidential information to their clients.”52 The Supreme
Court did not address the Fourth Amendment claims, but did hold that
the plaintiffs lacked standing as they could not prove injury in fact
because neither speculation of surveillance nor taking action to avoid
surveillance constitutes injury to warrant standing.53
B. Post-Snowden Leak Challenges and Recent Developments
Despite the above, the Supreme Court indicated a potential
willingness to address whether various methods of electronic surveillance
violated the Fourth Amendment in United States v. Jones, a case
involving the placement of a GPS tracker on a suspect’s vehicle.54 In a
concurring opinion, Justice Sotomayor suggested a need to revisit the
TPD in the digital age in the concurring opinion and noted that electronic
monitoring of individuals can chill associational and expressive freedoms
and that the government’s unfettered access to substantial intimate
information “may alter the relationship between citizen and government
that is inimical to democratic society.”55 Further, it may be “necessary to
reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation
of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties” as that
expectation is ill suited to the digital age due to the massive amounts of
information disclosed “in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.”56
Information disclosed to a third party for a limited purpose should not be
disentitled to Fourth Amendment protections simply because as it stands,
secrecy is a prerequisite for privacy.57
It is increasingly obvious that the court’s reliance upon the concept
that data is voluntarily disseminated is misplaced because of the reality
51

133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013).
Id. at 1145; see 50 U.S.C. § 1881(a) (2012).
53 Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1150–51.
54 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
55 Id. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d
272, 285 (7th Cir. 2011) (Flaum, J., concurring)).
56 Id. at 957.
57 Id. (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 749 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(“Privacy is not a discrete commodity, possessed absolutely or not at all.”)).
52
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that post-modern usage of the Internet is to conduct one’s necessary daily
activities, fostering arguments toward the fundamental right of access to
the Internet.58 There is no longer a dichotomy between voluntary and
involuntary relinquishment of electronic information due to the ubiquity
of e-communication, rendering untenable any construction of the Fourth
Amendment that makes unreasonable the expectation of privacy through
such communication.59 The Court recognized this distinction in City of
Ontario v. Quon,60 holding:
Rapid changes in the dynamics of communication and information
transmission are evident not just in the technology itself but in what
society accepts as proper behavior . . . . Cell phone and text message
communications are so pervasive that some persons may consider
them to be essential means or necessary instruments for selfexpression, even self-identification. That might strengthen the case
for an expectation of privacy.61

The Court seems to note that just because the way of life is changing
does not result in the loss of fundamental liberties, and as interactions
with third parties are fundamental to life in a technological era, invocation
of the TPD should be limited.62 This apparent trend of the Court toward
a more limited interpretation of the Fourth Amendment via technological
developments is, to a degree, corroborated by their recent holding in Riley
v. California, prohibiting the police from accessing the digital data stored
in a defendant’s cellular phone incident to arrest.63 The Court declined to
extend Smith to allow officers to examine a cell phone’s call logs.64
In that vein, Judge Richard Leon of the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia recently entered an order granting a
preliminary injunction prohibiting the NSA from continuing its ongoing
bulk collection of metadata in Klayman v. Obama.65 The court found that
the plaintiff, Larry Klayman, had standing to challenge both the NSA’s
58 Saby Ghoshray, Privacy Distortion Rationale for Reinterpreting the Third Party
Doctrine of the Fourth Amendment, 13 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 33, 74–75 (2011).
59 Id. at 74.
60 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629–30 (2010).
61 Id. (emphasis added).
62 See Ghoshray, supra note 58, at 80, 83.
63 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2485 (2014).
64 Id. (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–45 (1979)).
65 See Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013) (automatically staying the
temporary injunction was automatically due to national security concerns pending the
outcome of appeals), available at
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/JudgeLeonNSAopinion12162013.pdf.
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collection of metadata, and its analysis thereof in contravention of
Clapper; the government set forth an argument detailing the “historical
repository . . . of terrorist-related communications across multiple
telecommunications networks” and the creation of a “comprehensive
metadata database.”66
Judge Leon reasoned that the plaintiffs had a likelihood of success
on the merits of their Fourth Amendment claims because the FISC’s
reliance on Smith is misplaced due to the “evolutions in the Government’s
surveillance capabilities, citizens’ phone habits, and the relationship
between the NSA and telecom companies,” and that the “surveillance
program now before [the court] is so different from a simple pen register
that Smith is of little value.”67 In so holding, the court addressed the
plurality in Jones, as well as that in Quon, in denoting that an increasing
dependency on technology for everyday activities creates a greater and
more reasonable expectation of privacy in cell phone use as metadata
“reflects a wealth of detail about [individuals’] familial, political,
professional, religious, and sexual associations.”68 Moreover, it is likely
that the plaintiffs will be able to show that the collection of bulk metadata
constitutes an unreasonable search because “no court has ever recognized
a special need sufficient to justify continuous, daily searches of virtually
every American citizen without any particularized suspicion.”69
Shortly after the Klayman Order was entered, Judge William Pauley
entered a diametrically opposed Order in American Civil Liberties Union

66

Id. at 37–38.
Id. at 45, 47 (Additional differences between the scenario of Smith and bulk metadata
collection include the short term nature of the pen register versus the creation of a database
containing at least five years worth of historical information, the creation of a formal
partnership between the NSA and telecoms whereby the latter provide daily rolling updates
of all metadata moving through the networks, the “almost-Orwellian” technology that allows
for the storage of such metadata for analysis, and the nature and quantity of individuals’
collected metadata differs significantly from that collected in 1979 under the guidance of
Smith.).
68 See id. at 52–55 (discussing United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955–56 (2012)
(Sotomayor, J., concurring), 962 (Alito, J., concurring)); Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619,
2630 (2010).
69 Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 56–58 (citing Nat’l Fed’n Of Emps.-IAM v. Vilsack, 681
F.3d 483, 488–89 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (noting that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment absent some quantum of individualized suspicion); Bd. of Educ.
v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 830–34 (2002) (noting that context specific inquiries can merit
suspicionless searches upon consideration of the nature of the privacy interests compromised,
the character of the intrusion, and the nature and immediacy of the governments concerns and
whether the search will meet them.).
67
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(“ACLU”) v. Clapper,70 in the Southern District of New York. Therein,
Judge Pauley held that the ACLU was precluded from bringing a
statutory claim against Section 215 of the Patriot Act.71 More to the point,
Judge Pauley explicitly disagreed with the Klayman court in holding that
until the Supreme Court deemed otherwise, the Smith precedent must
hold and noted that “[t]he collection of breathtaking amounts of
information unprotected by the Fourth Amendment does not transform
that sweep into a Fourth Amendment search.”72
Regardless of Judge Pauley’s ruling in ACLU, Judge Leon’s novel
opinion in Klayman is the first instance of a court even making a
preliminary finding that the NSA domestic surveillance program is
unconstitutional. These opinions are clearly not the final word on the
matter, and there is little doubt that both will be appealed to the Supreme
Court. The timing of such appeals is questionable. Should the appeals
take the traditional route, it may be some time before the Supreme Court
speaks on either case, unless either are accepted on a petition for certiorari
before judgment. ACLU v. Clapper was argued before the Second Circuit
Court of Appeal on September 2, 2014, and Klayman v. Obama had not
yet been argued.73 As of September 2014, no opinion for either case has
been issued by the circuit courts.
V. PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE REMEDIES TO MASS DOMESTIC
SURVEILLANCE
With the limited efficacy in challenging the NSA’s domestic
surveillance programs in the courts, it is up to Congress to rein in the
NSA overreach. Despite significant concern in the private sector for
years regarding perceived governmental overreach via NSA surveillance,
bipartisan congressional support for greater transparency, oversight, and
reform of the intelligence community did not emerge until Mr. Snowden
began leaking classified documents exposing the breadth and depth of
government surveillance.74
70

959 F. Supp. 2d 724 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
Id. at 741 (citing Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340 (1984)).
72 Id. at 752.
73 ACLU v. Clapper—Challenge to NSA Mass Call-Tracking Program, AM. CIVIL
LIBERTIES UNION, https://www.aclu.org/national-security/aclu-v-clapper-challenge-nsamass-phone-call-tracking (last visited Dec. 16, 2014); Argument Calendar, Courtroom
1703, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT,
http://ww2.ca2.uscourts.gov/calendar/index.php?eID=380 (last visited Dec. 16, 2014).
74 Associated Press, House Passes NSA Regulations, First Legislation Since Snowden
71
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Prior to the Snowden leaks beginning in May 2013, the extent to
which Congress was aware of the scope of the NSA’s surveillance
program was likely limited. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence received full
briefings, but other members briefed did not have the benefit of staff
expertise to analyze the extensive program documentation.75
There is little doubt that the NSA’s surveillance programs are
overbroad, and it is collecting far more data than limited targeting would
suggest. However, few would argue against the importance of targeted
collection in a counterterrorism capacity. Thus, Congress’s first effort at
addressing the NSA surveillance program may not necessarily have
stricken an appropriate balance between Fourth Amendment protections
and counterterrorism intelligence gathering needs, although recent efforts
have gained more traction.
A. House Bills and Actions
i.
The Amash-Conyers Amendment
Congress’s first major effort to address the NSA’s overreach came
during the Department of Defense Appropriations Act debate via the
Amash-Conyers Amendment. The Amendment would have precluded
funding for any surveillance conducted by the NSA not explicitly falling
under the purview of 50 U.S.C. §1861, also known as Section 215 of the
PATRIOT Act, regarding the investigation of a suspected agent of a
foreign power.76 The Amendment was the subject of heated debate.
Leaks, CBSDC (May 22, 2014, 2:06 PM), http://washington.cbslocal.com/2014/05/22/housepasses-nsa-regulations-first-legislation-since-snowden-leaks/.
75 See Glenn Kessler, Obama’s Claim that ‘Every Member of Congress’ was Briefed on
Telephone Surveillance, WASH. POST FACT CHECKER (June 11, 2013, 6:00 AM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/post/obamas-claim-that-every-memberof-congress-was-briefed-on-telephone-surveillance/2013/06/10/fd03ea8e-d21f-11e2-8cbe1bcbee06f8f8_blog.html (relaying that Senator Jeff Merkley stated he needed special
permission to be briefed on the issue, not serving on the Intelligence Committee and
conveying that Representative Keith Ellison noted tackling the issue in depth required staff
assistance).
76 H.R. 2397, 113th Cong. § 1 (2013); H. Amend. 100 to H.R. 2397, 113th Cong. § 1
(2013) (“None of the funds made available by this Act may be used to execute a [FISC] order
pursuant to section 501 of [FISA] of 1978 (50 U.S.C § 1861) that does not include the
following sentence: ‘This Order limits the collection of any tangible things [including
metadata] that may be authorized to be collected pursuant to this Order to those tangible things
that pertain to a person who is subject of an investigation described in [50 U.S.C. § 1861]’”)
(Rep. Justin Amash (R), Rep. John Conyers Jr. (D)). Section 215 is widely regarded as
providing the basis through which surveillance overreach occurs by requiring disclosure of
tangible evidence via an Order specifying that the information sought is part and parcel to an
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Proponents argued that it would end abuse of Section 215 while allowing
legitimate investigations to continue.77 Opponents argued that this was
the wrong vehicle to address the issue. They argued that the NSA
program was constitutional because it did not access communication
content and it was necessary to continue battling terrorism.78
The Amash-Conyers Amendment came as somewhat of a surprise
to House members and shredded party lines by bringing together liberal
Democrats and Tea Party Republicans on both sides of the vote, but
ultimately failed in a vote of 217–205.79 At the time of the vote, members
had not yet conducted a full analysis of the issue and likely wanted to
hold hearings to determine how to best address the NSA programs before
simply cutting off funding.
ii.
The USA FREEDOM Act—Introduced Version
Representative Jim Sensenbrener, a Republican and the primary
sponsor of the USA PATRIOT Act, has introduced the comprehensive
USA FREEDOM Act to counteract the perceived NSA overreach
occurring through the implementation of Section 215.80 On introduction,
it had 102 bipartisan cosponsors, and Senator Patrick Leahy’s companion
bill in the Senate, Senate Bill 1599, has eighteen bipartisan cosponsors.81
The House of Representatives passed this bill with amendments that are

“authorized investigation . . . to protect against international terrorism. It is titled “Access to
certain business records for foreign intelligence and international terrorism investigations,”
and it provides, in part:
“(a)(1) The Director of the [FBI] . . . may make an application for an order requiring the
production of any tangible things . . . for an investigation to protect against international
terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities, provided that such investigation of a United
States person is not conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by the first
amendment to the Constitution.
(2) An investigation conducted under this section shall –(A) be conducted under guidelines
approved by the Attorney General under Executive Order 12333.” 50 U.S.C. § 1861(a)(1)(2).
77 See 159 CONG. REC. H4981, 5023–25 (statements of Reps. Justin Amash, John
Conyers, Jr., James Sensenbrenner) (daily ed. July 24, 2013).
78 Id. at 5024 (statements of Reps. Bill Young, Mike Rogers, and Michelle Bachmann).
79 Id. at 5028 (tallying the Yea votes that included Rep. Alan Grayson (D) and Rep. Raul
Labrador; Nay votes included Rep. Chris Van Hollen (D) and Rep. Michelle Bachmann).
80 See H.R. 3361, 113th Cong. (2013), available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/113thcongress/housebill/3361/cosponsors?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22hr+3361%22%5D%7D.
81 See id.; see also S. 1599, 113th Cong. (2013), available at
https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/senatebill/1599/cosponsors?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22s+1599%22%5D%7D.
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discussed in more detail below.82
The FREEDOM Act takes several steps to enact reforms to the
PATRIOT and FISA Amendment Acts. This includes placing stronger
requirements on obtaining FISC Orders for the production of information
by removing the presumption of relevance from any request and
precluding production for mere threat assessments.83 Likewise, it
prohibits the placement of PR and TT devices by precluding their use for
threat assessments and by requiring specificity in any request for such
devices.84 It also places minimization requirements on the use of such
devices for conducting surveillance by prohibiting the retention or
dissemination of information collected not pertaining to a target of the
search; for example, the NSA must enact procedures to discard any
dragnet information collected not correlated to targeted and approved
searches.85
Title III of the Act directly addresses Section 702 of FISA, 50 U.S.C.
§ 1881(a), by prohibiting a search of a collection of communications of a
“United States person” unless an emergency authorization is granted.86 It
also limits collecting communications information occurring within the
United States by limiting such to targeted individuals or those with a
targeted account identifier.87 It also strengthens, to a lesser degree,
prohibitions against reverse targeting of United States citizens by setting
forth that “a significant purpose” of foreign targeting cannot be to obtain
communications from a United States person.88
The FREEDOM Act also improves transparency of surveillance in
several ways. It requires that the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) release
opinions, in full, redacted, or as summaries, issued by the FISC from 2003
forward that include a significant construction or interpretation of law
describing the issue of law and basis of the decision.89 Second, it permits
telecoms to disclose quarterly estimates of the number of orders received
82 The House passed H.R. 3361 on Roll Call Vote No. 230 by a vote of 303–121. 160
CONG. REC. H4789, 4789–93 (2014).
83 H.R. 3361 § 101 (amending 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)).
84 Id. at § 201 (amending 50 U.S.C. § 1842(c)).
85 Id. at § 202 (amending 50 U.S.C. § 1842).
86 Id. at § 301 (amending 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(b)).
87 Id. (amending 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(d) & (i)).
88 H.R. 3361 § 303 (as introduced) (amending 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(b)), available at
https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/housebill/3361/text/162269?q={%22search%22:[%22hr%203361%22]}.
89 Id. at § 4 (amending Title IX, § 905).
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and complied with and the number of accounts affected.90 Last, it requires
annual disclosure of orders applied for and granted and the number of
United States persons targeted.91
The Act, as introduced, proposed the creation of an “Office of the
Special Advocate” that would act as counsel to entities against which
Orders to Produce are sought and will represent such entities before the
FISC.92 This section of the bill would also create a right to appeal FISC
decisions before a review panel, which would examine the issue under de
novo review.93
iii.
Other House Bills
A number of smaller bills that address limited aspects of the
FREEDOM Act have been introduced in the House, but none have the
extensive and bipartisan support thereto afforded. One such bill, the
Surveillance State Repeal (“SSR”) Act, does exactly as its name indicates
in fully repealing the PATRIOT and 2008 FISA Amendments Acts,
requiring instead that a probable cause warrant be issued to collect
information on United States persons and requiring stronger
whistleblower protections.94 Another bill that has received attention, the
Intelligence Oversight and Accountability Act, essentially only requires
greater reporting to Congress on orders before the FISC and affords no
public transparency.95
A third, the Government Surveillance
Transparency Act, allows the disclosures sought by technology
companies by permitting the release of the aggregate number of FISC
orders with which they were required to comply.96 The Telephone
Surveillance Accountability Act only increases the standard by which an
order for a search of telephone metadata is granted from relevance to a
“reasonable articulable suspicion.”97

90 Id. at § 604 (as referred in the Senate) (amending 50 U.S.C. § 1862(b)) (In H.R. 3361,
as introduced, the disclosure limitations were set forth in § 601).
91 Id. at § 602 (as referred in the Senate).
92 Id. at § 401 (establishing the Office of the Special Advocate and Title IX, “The Office
of the Special Advocate,” in 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1885).
93 Id. (establishing the Office of the Special Advocate).
94 See H.R. 2818, 113th Cong. (2013).
95 H.R. 3103, 113th Cong. § 2 (2013).
96 H.R. 2736, 113th Cong. § 901 (2013).
97 H.R. 2684, 113th Cong. § 2 (2013).

OMBRES.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

NSA DOMESTIC SURVEILLANCE

1/22/2015 10:30 AM

45

B. Comprehensive Senate Bills and Actions
A companion bill to the original USA FREEDOM Act was
introduced in the Senate as Senate Bill 1599, but has since been updated
by Senator Patrick Leahy as Senate Bill 2685 following passage of the
Act in the House.98 In addition to the USA FREEDOM Act, Senator Ron
Wyden and Senator Diane Feinstein have introduced two comprehensive
bills to address NSA surveillance, the Intelligence Oversight and
Surveillance Reform Act and the FISA Improvements Act, respectively.99
Senator Wyden’s bill is substantially similar to the FREEDOM Act with
some ancillary addendums. For instance, it provides additional
protections to ensure that no records obtained extrajudicially from an
order will be admissible in court.100 It significantly addresses reverse
targeting of United States persons and requires greater disclosure of FISA
orders.101 It also addresses the Supreme Court’s holding in ACLU by
creating a cause of action to challenge government surveillance via a
reasonable belief that communications will be collected and reasonable
steps were taken to avoid surveillance.102
Conversely, Senator Feinstein’s bill, which passed out of the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence, has been much derided for essentially
codifying the NSA’s conduct of the past decade.103 While there is a
section titled “General Prohibition on Bulk Collection,” it actually allows
for metadata collection upon identifying the facility from which it will be
collected and using minimization procedures relative to who can utilize
the records and how, but annual aggregated numbers of investigative
98

S. 2685, 113th Cong. § 2 (2014); S. 1599, 113th Cong. § 1 (2013).
S. 1631, 113th Cong. § 1 (2013); S. 1551, 113th Cong. § 1 (2013).
100 S. 1551 §§ 101–02 (amending sections entitled “Privacy Protections for Section 215
Business Records Orders” and “Emergency Authority for Access to Call Data Records,”
respectively).
101 Id. at §§ 302, 406 (amending section entitled “Protections Against Collection of
Wholly Domestic Communications not Concerning Terrorism under FISA Amendment Act”
and adding section entitled “Disclosure,” respectively).
102 Id. at § 305 (amending section entitled “Challenges to Government Surveillance”).
103 S. REP. NO. 113–119, at 12 (2013); John Hudson & Shane Harris, Diane Feinstein is
Still a Friend of the NSA, FOREIGN POLICY, (Oct. 31, 2013, 6:21 PM),
http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/10/31/diane_feinstein_is_still_a_friend_of_the
_nsa_after_all; Matt Sledge, Senate Intelligence Committee Passes Bill That Codifies,
Expands NSA Powers, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 31, 2013, 4:30 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/10/31/senate-bill-nsa_n_4183183.html; Trevor Timm,
Sen. Diane Feinstein’s New NSA Bill Will Codify and Extend Mass Surveillance of Americans,
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Oct. 31, 2013), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/10/senfeinsteins-nsa-bill-will-codify-and-extend-mass-surveillance.
99
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leads, warrants, and court orders would be publicly released.104 To a
degree, it provides for greater congressional oversight by requiring
semiannual Attorney General reports and an annual Director of National
Intelligence report on violations of the law or executive order and by
providing access to all FISC orders to the congressional intelligence
committees and other members of Congress.105 However, it does not
provide for additional public transparency.106
Another piece of the bill limits targeting of foreign nationals
entering the United States to an additional seventy-two hours, which has
been subject to abuse.107 Lastly, two improvements to the current
surveillance regime allow the FISC to appoint amicus counsel to address
novel issues before it and increase criminal penalties for gaining
unauthorized access to data collected under the FISA surveillance
programs.108
i.
USA FREEDOM Act
The updated Senate version, Senate Bill 2685, of the USA
FREEDOM Act is trimmed down as well and maintains differences with
the House passed iteration of the Act, House Bill 3361. Notably, House
Bill 3361 provides broader leeway in obtaining information and call data
through the use of specific selection terms.109 Under Senate Bill 2685,
applying to the FISC for a search requires a factual statement reflecting
that foreign powers or agents thereto are engaging in “international
terrorism or activities in preparation therefor,” while House Bill 3361
only requires a showing that such a search relates to foreign powers.110
House Bill 3361 specifically references the need to “protect against
international terrorism,” after defining the necessary showing to grant an
application, but the Senate’s more exacting language appears to close a
104

S. REP. NO. 113–119 § 2 (discussing section entitled “Supplemental Procedures for
Acquisitions of Certain Business Records for Counterterrorism Purposes”).
105 See id. at § 2; S. 1631, 113th Cong. §§ 509, 601–2 (2013) (discussing sections entitled
“Annual Reports on Violations of Law or Executive Order,” “Semiannual Report of the
Attorney General,” and “Availability of Reports and Submissions,” respectively).
106 Id.
107 Id. at § 7 (discussing section entitled “Temporary Targeting of Persons other than
United States Persons Traveling into the United States”).
108 Id. at §§ 3–4 (discussing sections entitled “Enhanced Criminal Penalties for
Unauthorized Access to Collected Data” and “Appointment of Amicus Curiae,” respectively).
109 Compare S. 2685, 113th Cong. § 101(a) (2014), with H.R. 3361, 113th Cong. § 101(a)
(2013) (as referred in the Senate).
110 Compare S. 2685 § 101(a), with H.R. 3361 § 101(a).
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loophole that could conceivably be utilized to collect additional
metadata.111
Additionally, Senate Bill 2685, in Title I, FISA Business Records
Reform, creates a more exacting definition in furtherance of minimization
procedures by including a subsection applying such procedures to
persons not the subject of authorized investigations or in contact with
such persons or who are not suspected agents of foreign powers.112 A
similar section is not contained in the version of House Bill 3361 that was
passed in the House.113
The concern regarding overly broad or undefined terms under the
context of “specific selection term” is somewhat abrogated in Senate Bill
2685. Rather than the term “device,” the term “personal device” is
utilized; this qualifying word presumably creates greater limitations on
searches to an individual or entity’s cell phone, tablet, or computer.114
Senate Bill 2685 also focuses on the need to narrowly tailor searches by
precluding the use of overly broad references to geographical location or
communications service providers standing alone, which is omitted from
House Bill 3361.115
The most notable difference between Senate Bill 2685 and House
Bill 3361, in the section pertaining to PR and TT devices, is the specific
inclusion of the stronger definition of “specific selection devices” and the
definition of “address” as relating to physical and electronic addresses,
such as an email, temporary network, or internet protocol address.116
As to FISA acquisitions for persons located outside of the United
States, Senate Bill 2685 implicitly maintains standing minimization
requirements, while House Bill 3361 specifically prohibits the
dissemination of information stemming from persons located in the
United States.117 However, Senate Bill 2685 cites as applicable
111

Compare S. 2685 § 101(a), with H.R. 3361 § 101(a).
S. 2685 § 103(c) (amending section entitled “Prohibition on Bulk Collection of
Tangible Things: Minimization Procedures”).
113 Compare S. 2685 § 103(c), with H.R. 3361 Title I.
114 Compare S. 2685 § 107 (amending section entitled “Definitions”), with H.R. 3361 §
107 (as referred in the Senate).
115 Compare S. 2685 § 107 (amending section entitled “Definitions”), with H.R. 3361 §
107 (as referred in the Senate).
116 S. 2685 § 201 (amending section entitled “Prohibition on Bulk Collection”).
117 Compare S. 2685 § 301 (amending section entitled “Limits on Use of Unlawfully
Obtained Information”), with H.R. 3361 § 301 (amending section entitled “Clarification on
Prohibition on Searching of Collections of Communications to Conduct Warrantless Searches
for the Communications of United States Persons”).
112
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minimization procedures precluding the dissemination of non-public
information regarding non-consenting United States person.118
Senate Bill 2685 also declines to create an Office of the Special
Advocate, whose role would be to advocate for privacy issues.119
However, like the passed version of House Bill 3361, it provides for amici
to work with the FISC in analyzing applications and applying the law to
same.120 A further substantial difference is that Senate Bill 2685 requires
the courts to appoint a panel of amici and provides explicit detail for their
role in advocating before the court, including their ability to obtain
independent technical experts to assist in their analysis of the issues.121
With regard to transparency in declassifying decisions, orders, and
opinions of the FISC, Senate Bill 2685 and House Bill 3361 are identical,
as outlined in the discussion of House Bill 3361, above.122 Other
transparency provisions have differing requirements, such as Senate Bill
2685’s insistence that governmental reports be published on the
Internet.123 Senate Bill 2685 also requires greater specificity with respect
to the information disclosed in such governmental reports, including the
number of persons whose communications were collected and those who
are believed to be located in the United States.124 Likewise, Senate Bill
2685 provides slightly more specificity than House Bill 3361 relative to
disclosures permitted by entities toward which FISC orders and national
security letters are directed; other than the Senate provision prohibiting
the disclosure of orders affecting new services or platforms for 540 days,
the iterations are substantially similar.125 Lastly, Senate Bill 2685 places
118

See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(h), 1821(4) (2012).
Compare S. 2685 § 401 (discussing the appointment of amicus curiae), with H.R. 3361
§ 401 (as referred in the Senate) (establishing the Office of the Special Advocate).
120 Compare S. 2685 § 401 (discussing the appointment of amicus curiae), with H.R. 3361
§ 401 (as referred in the Senate) (establishing the Office of the Special Advocate).
121 Compare S. 2685 § 401 (discussing the appointment of amicus curiae), with H.R. 3361
§ 401 (as referred in the Senate) (establishing the Office of the Special Advocate).
122 Compare S. 2685 § 402 (amending section entitled “Declassification of Decisions,
Orders, and Opinions”), with H.R. 3361 § 402 (as referred in the Senate) (amending section
entitled “Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Disclosure of Opinions”), and S. 2685 §
101(a), with H.R. 3361 § 101(a).
123 S. 2685 §§ 602–03 (amending sections entitled “Annual Reports by the Government”
and “Public Reporting by Persons Subject to FISA Orders,” respectively).
124 Compare S. 2685 § 602 (amending section entitled “Annual Reports by the
Government”), with H.R. 3361 § 603 (as referred in the Senate) (amending section entitled
“Annual Reports by the Government on Orders Entered”).
125 Compare S. 2685 § 603 (amending section entitled “Public Reporting by Persons
Subject to FISA Orders”), with H.R. 3361 § 604 (as referred in the Senate) (amending section
119
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limitations on the disclosure of national security letters if such would
result in national security risks, interference with diplomatic relations,
interference with investigations, or danger to the life and safety of any
person.126
ii.
Other Senate Bills
As in the House, several smaller bills have been introduced in the
Senate, including the Ending Secret Law (“ESL”) Act, the Surveillance
Transparency Act (“STA”), the Freedoms and Privacy Act (“FPA”), and
Senate Bill 1182, to amend FISA regarding evidence necessary to access
business records.127 Again, these bills occur in piecemeal rather than
comprehensive fashion, but include some interesting provisions worth
considering.
The ESL Act requires the disclosure of all FISC orders that involve
interpretation of FISA subject to national security concerns, and if an
order cannot be declassified under that basis, a summary of each decision
must be released.128 Senate Bill 1182 parallels the FREEDOM Act in
setting forth stricter requirements by creating a factual basis upon which
orders of production for documents and metadata can be sought.129
The STA seeks to expand government reporting requirements under
NSA surveillance programs by requiring the Attorney General to submit
an annual unclassified report that reflects: the total number of
applications to the FISC for orders for production and for PR/TT use; the
number of orders granted, modified, or denied; and good faith estimates
for the number of individuals whose electronic information was collected
through the NSA surveillance programs.130 It also allows telecoms to
issue biannual reports reflecting the number of orders received and
complied with and the number of people whose information was collected
pursuant to the orders.131
entitled “Public Reporting by Persons Subject to Orders”).
126 S. 2685 § 502 (amending section entitled “Limitations on Disclosure of National
Security Letters”).
127 S. 1701, 113th Cong. § 1 (2013); S. 1452, 113th Cong. § 1 (2013); S. 1182, 113th
Cong. § 1 (2013); S. 1130, 113th Cong. § 1 (2013).
128 S. 1130 § 4 (amending section entitled “Requirement for Disclosure of Decisions,
Orders, and Opinions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court”).
129 S. 1182 § 1 (amending section entitled “Specific Evidence for Court Orders to Produce
Records and Other Items in Intelligence Investigations”).
130 S. 1452 § 2 (amending section entitled “Enhanced Public Reporting for Orders under
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978”).
131 Id. at § 3 (amending section entitled “Public Disclosures of Aggregate Information
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The FPA amends FISA to allow individuals being federally
prosecuted based on evidence garnered from NSA surveillance programs
to seek discovery of the applications to, and orders for production or for
PR and TT devices entered by, the FISC.132 It also requires written
certification by the Attorney General to use such evidence in criminal
proceedings or to share the information within the law enforcement
community and that these certifications must aggregate and summarize
the incidences of utilizing the information in investigations or criminal
proceedings in biannual reports to Congress.133
VI. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE BILLS AND POTENTIAL
RESOLUTIONS
It goes without saying that the standalone bills addressing only small
portions of the NSA surveillance regime will not alone address the
overreach concerns prevalent among the public, corporations, and
Congress itself. Even taken together, they do not meet the level of
institutional reform necessary to adequately address what is occurring.
Senator Feinstein’s proposal also does not sufficiently address concerns
about the NSA’s surveillance programs; rather, it appears to codify the
NSA’s ongoing activities, as it provides for additional oversight rather
than reform as she believes that “[t]he NSA call-records program is legal
and subject to extensive congressional and judicial oversight.”134
As such, the USA FREEDOM Act stands alone as actually
providing comprehensive reform, while also being politically palatable
by allowing for possible bipartisan passage. Certainly, both the passed
version of House Bill 3361 and the updated Senate Bill 2685 of the Act
are not as strong as they were upon initial introduction, but they are still
more comprehensive than the piecemeal bills. The more recent Senate
version of Senate Bill 2685 is not a significantly far cry from the original
iteration of the Act, save for the elimination of the Office of the Special
Advocate, which could potentially create legal and constitutional
issues.135 Key improvements to the current regime include greater
Related to Orders Under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978”).
132 S. 1701 § 2 (amending section entitled “Oversight and Disclosure Procedures of FISA
Intelligence in Federal Proceedings”).
133 Id. at § 602 (amending section entitled “Reports to Congress on Intelligence
Community and Law Enforcement Collaboration”).
134 See Sledge, supra note 103.
135 See ANDREW NOLAN, RICHARD M. THOMPSON II, & VIVIAN CHU, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., R43260, REFORM OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURTS:
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transparency, through improved disclosure protocols that allow public
acknowledgement of the number of orders for production entered against
telecoms and the number of people affected, increased oversight by
Congress through greater reporting requirements, and most importantly,
creation of a process to allow for the appointment of amicus curiae who
have expertise in privacy and civil liberties issues, intelligence collection,
telecommunications, or other relevant fields to assist the FISC; all of
which have generally received broad support.136 The section providing
for an Office of the Public Advocate has been removed from the House
and Senate bills and replaced with the provision allowing for amicus
curiae, potentially due to the constitutional and practical implications that
maintaining a standing Special Advocate would entail.137
The FREEDOM Act is not without fault and could be strengthened
by amending it to include some of the provisions of the piecemeal bills.
For example, civil liberties advocates may feel that the FREEDOM Act
does not strengthen minimization requirements to sufficiently address
Judge Kollar-Kotelly’s ruling that PR and TT devices need not require
specific identification of the target, thus permitting dragnet collection of

INTRODUCING A PUBLIC ADVOCATE (Mar. 21, 2014) (The public advocate can potentially be
viewed as an agent of the government and may act as a principal or inferior officer of the
United States. The public advocate would be subject to the Article II Appointments Clause
mandates. Under Article III, it is questionable whether such an advocate has standing to argue
the “case” or “controversy” before the FISC due to the requirement that they have been
injured, are threated to suffer injury by putatively illegal conduct, or are authorized to
represent such an injured party. Likewise, Article III generally prohibits the government from
litigating against itself, and allowing the advocate to seek relief on national security issues
could invade core executive branch powers. Last, as the advocate would not be a party or
representative of a party, they may not have standing to appeal FISC orders.); see also
ANDREW NOLAN, RICHARD M. THOMPSON II, & VIVIAN CHU, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., OCT.
25, INTRODUCING A PUBLIC ADVOCATE INTO THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT’S
COURTS: SELECT LEGAL ISSUES (2013); cf. Marty Lederman & Steve Vladick, The
Constitutionality of a FISA “Special Advocate,” JUST SECURITY (Nov. 4, 2013, 1:34 PM),
http://justsecurity.org/2873/fisa-special-advocate-constitution/ (arguing that Appointments
Clause arguments may be rendered moot if the position were not permanent and the advocate
was selected on a case-by-case basis, and even if they were a government employee, they
would not exercise significant government authority, and thus not fall under Appointments
Clause requirements. Likewise, the standing issue would be abrogated with properly drafted
legislation by precluding the advocate from being a party to the case, but merely having a
lawyer present, possibly for third parties whose metadata and communications are at issue.
As to appeals, they propose legislation denoting the advocate in a role akin to a guardian ad
litem, so that they could be representative of absent third parties).
136 See generally S. 2685, 113th Cong. (2014).
137 H.R. 3361, 113th Cong. § 401 (2014); S. 2685 § 401.
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metadata.138 This could be strengthened by including the portion of the
SSR Act that requires a warrant for domestic surveillance.139
It is feasible that the FREEDOM Act could also incorporate some of
Senator Feinstein’s oversight provisions, such as allowing all members
of Congress access to adequately redacted FISC orders.140 However, there
is still the issue of being able to provide full and adequate oversight of
the program, without which runs the risk that the NSA could again run
roughshod over Congress. The current system stymies oversight by only
permitting members of Congress access to the classified information
under which the NSA programs operate, disallowing them expert analysis
of their own staffs and instead requiring reliance on the information
provided by intelligence agencies in briefings, as the members do not
have the time to review thousands of documents to make fully informed
decisions on the subject.141
Even if the FISC transparency provisions permitting disclosure of
orders are enacted, the FREEDOM Act still may not prove sufficient to
allow for full and adequate congressional oversight. To that end, it would
be worth considering creating a non-partisan Standing Joint Committee
on Intelligence Oversight, akin to the Joint Committee on Taxation, that
would be staffed by experts in national security and constitutional law
issues. This committee staff would have the security clearance necessary
to review the conduct of the NSA and any other involved agencies,
outside of the auspices of the agency Inspectors General offices and the
DOJ, so as to be able to provide clear guidance to Congress on the
efficacy of reform and to ensure that the surveillance activities
undertaken fall within constitutional confines and the enacted statutory
regimes.142
138

See FISC Opinion, supra note 32, at 23 (“The Court recognizes that by concluding
that these definitions do not restrict the use of [PR] and [TT] devices to communication
facilities associated with individual users, it is finding that these definitions encompass an
exceptionally broad form of collection.”).
139 See H.R. 2818, 113th Cong. § 1 (2013).
140 S. 1631, 113th Cong. § 5 (2013) (amending section entitled “Availability of Reports
and Submissions”).
141 See Kessler, supra note 75 (describing that Rep. Ellison noted that the voluminous
nature of the documents available required expert and staff assistance to review).
142 It has been proposed that a Select Committee be established to investigate whether
unconstitutional surveillance has occurred and whether officials acted improperly in doing so.
However, this seems a temporary fix, which may dissolve into the realm of the political, rather
than a long term option to adequately supervise this aspect of the intelligence community.
See H. Res. 350, 113th Cong. § 3 (2013).
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Other issues that the FREEDOM Act does not address include
creating a cause of action for individuals and entities actually harmed by
NSA surveillance and the appearance of NSA meddling in NIST
encryption creation and gaining unauthorized access to overseas servers.
The first issue will likely not be resolved for a variety of reasons,
including that this would potentially make the government liable for an
untold number of alleged Fourth Amendment infringements, and the real
world eventuality that such liability would create an undue burden on the
courts from the thousands of individual claims or class action claims that
could seek to draw millions of citizens into the class that would
immediately commence.
None of the proposed legislation addresses the issue of NSA/NIST
collaboration in creating backdoors to encryption systems. Additional
congressional oversight could address the issue, but to address it at the
outset and staunch the financial harm befalling the United States tech
industry, the most readily available way to address the issue, would be
the budgetary mechanism of defunding the SIGINT Enabling Project.
This would limit the NSA’s ability to strong-arm NIST and major
telecoms and reinstill public trust in the tech industry.143
Regardless of the potential for reform and transparency inherent in
the FREEDOM Act, it still must overcome the major hurdle of being
passed by both houses of Congress and signed into law by the President.
Given the nature of the amendments made to the House passed version
of the Act, it is unlikely that any Senate version of the bill will be
strengthened by the provisions denoted above. Rather, even in its
amended form, it may yet face roadblocks due to Senator Feinstein’s
competing bill, which received strong bipartisan support in the
Intelligence Committee. Should the Senate pass the bill substantially
unamended from its present form, it could still stall when returned to the
House for passage or in Conference. As of September 2014, there were
merely seven legislative calendar weeks left in the year, four of which are
considered “lame duck” due to their occurrence after the mid-term
elections.

143 Nicole Gaouette, NSA Spying Risks $35 Billion in U.S. Technology Sales, BLOOMBERG
(Nov. 26, 2013, 4:20 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-11-26/nsa-spying-risks35-billion-in-u-s-technology-sales.html.
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VII. PREEMPTIVE PRESIDENTIAL ACTION
An additional aspect of NSA surveillance reform that must be
considered is the release of the Report and Recommendations of the
President’s Review Group on Intelligence and Communications
Technology.144 The Review Group issued a lengthy report stressing the
need to maintain the public trust that has been damaged resulting from
the Snowden disclosures and setting forth a list of forty-six reform
recommendations.145
Many of these reform recommendations closely parallel the reform
provisions set forth in the FREEDOM Act, including, but not limited to:
requiring that the disclosure of metadata from third parties pursuant to
FISC Order or National Security Letter be narrower in scope than
currently provided for; permitting telecoms to release generic
information pertaining to the number of orders received, complied with,
and the scope of information produced; purging collected information on
United States persons if collected through surveillance of foreign persons
unless it has “foreign intelligence value or is necessary to prevent serious
harm to others;” and creating the position of Public Interest Advocate to
represent privacy and civil liberties interests before the FISC.146 Other
recommendations permit for the continued collection and storage of
metadata by the telecoms themselves, or third parties, not the
government, and for only limited government access to such
information.147 Still others would further limit executive power, already
imperiled by the push toward bringing the administration and the NSA
under greater congressional oversight, including making the Director of
the National Security Agency subject to Senate confirmation, permitting
that the Director be a civilian, and disallowing the Director from also
being in charge of United States Cyber Command, a military unit.148
On January 17, 2014, the President announced that he would take
efforts to implement reforms to foreign intelligence surveillance
activities prior to March 28, 2014, the date of renewal for the law
144 RICHARD A. CLARK, ET AL., LIBERTY AND SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD: REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GROUP ON INTELLIGENCE AND
COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY (2013), available at

http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/12/19/us/politics/19nsa-review.html?_r=0
[hereinafter PRESIDENTIAL REPORT].
145 Id. at 17–18, 24–42.
146 Id. at 24, 28–29, 36 (discussing recommendations 1, 2, 12, 28).
147 Id. at 17.
148 Id. at 34, 210 (discussing recommendations 22–24).
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authorizing metadata collection.149 This includes three primary actions:
decreasing the numbers of “hops” from a source phone number from
which data can be collected; permitting that metadata be held by third
parties rather than the government allowing access only through FISC
approval; and creating the post of the public interest advocate.150 A crucial
aspect of these changes was the recommendation reducing the number of
“hops” from a source phone number from three to two.151 Procedural
changes implemented include the requirement that the FISC approve
queries of telephony metadata on a case-by-case basis and precluding the
government from storing bulk metadata, placing the onus on the
telephone companies to maintain the records only as they would in the
ordinary course of business.152 The public interest advocate position was
not created, likely due to the constitutional and practical challenges to the
implementation of such a position in such a short period of time, as
outlined above.153 Ultimately, the President’s acts were limited in scope,
and the amendments to the House’s passed version of the USA
FREEDOM Act align with the implemented changes in part.
VIII. CONCLUSION
To paraphrase the common understanding of Benjamin Franklin’s
quote, those who would give up an essential liberty for safety deserve
neither liberty nor safety.154 However, it seems we have already crossed
149 Fred Kaplan, Pretty Good Privacy: The Three Ambitious NSA Reforms Endorsed by
Obama, and the One he Rejected, SLATE (Jan. 17, 2014, 4:01 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/war_stories/2014/01/obama_s_nsa_reform
s_the_president_s_proposals_for_metadata_and_the_fisa.html.
150 Id. (A “hop” being a colloquial term indicating connections between phone numbers,
i.e. one hop is the direct connection between the targeted phone number and all phone
numbers it called, or received calls from. The second hop is the connection between the
second tier of phone numbers and all phone number they called and received calls from. The
third hop follows suit, bringing the potential amount of acquired metadata into the thousands
or tens of thousands of phone numbers from a single target.).
151 H.R Rep. No. 113–452, 14 (2014).
152
Id.
153 Ellen Nakashima, Surveillance-court Judges Oppose White House Group’s NSA
Proposals, WASH. POST (Jan. 14, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/surveillance-court-judges-oppose-white-house-groups-nsaproposals/2014/01/14/3c41e1e2-7d60-11e3-93c1-0e888170b723_story.html; see NOLAN ET
AL., supra note 135.
154 See Benjamin Wittes, Would Benjamin Franklin Trade Liberty for Wiretapping?, THE
BROOKINGS INSTITUTE, (June 12, 2013 8:57 AM), http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/upfront/posts/2013/06/11-ben-franklin-liberty-wiretapping-security; see also Benjamin Wittes,
Against a Crude Balance: Platform Security and the Hostile Symbiosis Between Liberty and
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that Rubicon as a nation. The American public shares immeasurable
amounts of information, both knowingly and unknowingly, with each
other; corporations; and now the government, through our everyday acts
on social media, online purchasing, and use of cell phones. We have
reached a point where the public has few qualms with this proposition,
save for the overreach of the government in collecting metadata on all
communications, not including their content. Most Americans, too, are
likely torn by the collections of communications metadata impinging on
their privacy and the necessity to conduct global surveillance on
increasingly tech savvy terrorist groups to prevent future attacks on
American soil. This concern is highlighted by the discovery of
westerners, including persons from the United States, attempting to join
ranks with extremist groups, such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria.155
While it would be wonderful to return to the FISA scheme in place
pre-9/11, that is no longer feasible from a technological, national security,
sociopolitical, or even infrastructure-based standpoint, given current
geopolitics, international terrorist threats, and the billions invested in
surveillance and data storage infrastructure. As such, we appear to be
relegated to imperfect reforms, the best of these being the USA
FREEDOM legislation, which could still further be strengthened by
amending it to include portions of the bills noted above and by creating a
non-partisan joint committee within Congress, although the potential for
the latter has not garnered much support.156
Although President Obama has taken action to reform the NSA’s
collection of domestic communication data, the FREEDOM Act should
be enacted, regardless of any redundancies with administration policy.
The Act will aid in providing greater transparency and oversight to the
NSA surveillance programs currently in place and stem perceived
violations of the Fourth Amendment.157
Security,
THE BROOKINGS
INSTITUTE
(Sept.
21,
2011),
available
at
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2011/09/21-platform-security-wittes (the author
argues that the quote is now routinely taken out of context and refers not to civil liberties, but
to the “right of self-governance of a legislature in the interests of collective security”).
155 Michael S. Schmidt and Erick Schmitt, U.S. Identifies Citizens Joining Rebels in
Syria, Including ISIS, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/29/world/middleeast/us-identifies-citizens-joining-rebelsin-syria.html?_r=0.
156 Representative Rokita’s House Resolution 350 garnered only three cosponsors. H.
Res. 350, 113th Cong. (2013).
157 The USA FREEDOM Act, S. 2685, failed on a cloture vote by a vote of 58–42 in
favor of cloture on November 18, 2014. The Library of Congress, S. 2685 – USA FREEDOM
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Further, it has yet to be determined whether the mass collection of
metadata actually violates the Fourth Amendment, given the opposite
holdings of Klayman and ACLU v. Clapper. If the courts ultimately come
down on the side of Klayman and civil libertarians, they may well follow
Judge Leon’s insight into evolving legal theory as it pertains to the Third
Party Doctrine and Smith v. Maryland, as discussed above.
Since the Supreme Court, and no federal circuit court, has
overturned Smith, Judge Leon’s ruling that NSA surveillance violates the
Fourth Amendment may not withstand initial appellate consideration on
the basis of stare decisis. However, regardless of the outcome in the
District of Columbia Circuit Court, the Supreme Court may well grant
certiorari, and the Court will ultimately speak to the issue of whether
mass NSA data collection is unconstitutional. Even absent taking up the
Klayman case, the Court will, at a minimum, likely take up a similar issue
in the context of whether there is a privacy expectation in protecting cell
site location information generated when cell phones are used to prevent
the government from being able access this information without a warrant
due to a split between the circuit courts on the issue.158
To that end, the Court may help address these issues by adopting
something akin to Professor Stephen Henderson’s four-part test to
determine whether Fourth Amendment privacy protections should apply
to an individual, which, to a degree, coincides with the concerns
expressed via the USA FREEDOM Act and the recommendations of the
President’s review panel. The test includes whether:
(1) The initial transfer of the information from the person to a third
party is reasonably necessary to participate meaningfully in society or is
socially beneficial, including to freedom of speech and association;
(2) The information is personal, including the extent to which it is
intimate and likely to cause embarrassment or stigma if disclosed, and
whether outside of the initial transfer to a third party it is typically
disclosed only within one’s close social network, if at all;
Act of 2014, CONGRESS.GOV. https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/senatebill/2685?q={%22search%22%3A[%22\%22Usa+freedom\%22%22]} (last visited Dec. 29,
2014); U.S. SENATE, U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 113th Congress – 2nd Session,
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=113
&session=2&vote=00282 (last visited Dec. 29, 2014).
158 See In re United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600 (5th Cir. 2013)
(holding that no warrants are required to obtain cell site data); cf. In re United States for an
Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620
F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding the government is required to show probable cause to obtain
a warrant to gain access to cell site location information).
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(3) The information is accessible to and accessed by nongovernment
persons outside the institution; and
(4) Existing law restricts or allows access to and dissemination of
the information or similar information.159
Until the courts begin addressing these privacy concerns, enactment
of the FREEDOM Act will be a strong first step toward reform and
transparency. However, if NSA overreach continues, there may be
renewed and more vociferous calls to pursue the remedies suggested by
Representative Holt, repealing the PATRIOT Act and the FISA
Amendments Act, and starting anew.
Of course, this is neither practically nor politically feasible, and it
must be questioned whether such would put the nation in a precarious
national security scenario akin to that in place prior to 9/11, considering
the growth of international terroristic activities. It is not a far reach to say
that regardless of safeguards enacted by and oversight provided by
Congress, as technological advances accelerate and now that the
electronic surveillance infrastructure has been built, it will not be going
away anytime soon. Accordingly, Congress and the American public
must remain vigilant to strike a balance ensuring both that the nation’s
security is provided for and that the Fourth Amendment is not buried
under the “need for security.”

159 Stephen E. Henderson, The Timely Demise of the Fourth Amendment Third Party
Doctrine, 96 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 39, 50–51 (2011).

